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U.C.L.A. Law Review		 		
Forgiven, Forgotten? Rethinking Victim Impact Statements
for an Era of Decarceration
		

Hugh M. Mundy

ABSTRACT
Laws enacting victim impact statements flourished in the 1980s and 90s, a period defined
by draconian crime control measures and mass incarceration. During an emerging era of
decarceration, the effect of victim impact statements on excessive prison sentences has been
largely overlooked. Reshaping retributive laws governing victim impact statements is essential to
comprehensive sentencing reform. Victims’ rights laws must integrate meaningful opportunities
for victim-offender reconciliation. First, victim-offender reconciliation is integral to landmark
revisions to the Model Penal Code geared to reduce prison populations. Further, victim-offender
reconciliation is consistent with judicial precedent and recent legislative trends as to the purpose
and admissibility of victim impact statements. Finally, victim-offender reconciliation embraces the
public policy goals of victims’ rights laws: to restore dignity to victims, to educate defendants about
the human consequences of their crime, and to fully inform courts about the crimes’ societal harms.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 2019, Mark Gibbs 1 appeared in a Jonesboro, Illinois
courthouse to face sentencing for the murders of his parents, Richie and
Betty. 2 The sentencing hearing was nearly thirty years in the making. Mark
committed the crimes in 1992 as a high school sophomore. 3 Though still a
child, he was tried as an adult by the Union County State’s Attorney. 4 Mark
confessed and pleaded guilty, triggering an automatic term of life in prison
without the possibility of parole. 5
Mark’s opportunity for a sentencing hearing arose by virtue of Miller v.
Alabama, a 2012 U.S. Supreme Court case declaring unconstitutional
mandatory life sentences for juveniles convicted of crimes. 6 In its ruling, the
Court stressed that juvenile life sentences foreclose essential sentencing
considerations such as the child’s cognitive development at the time of the
crime, his “family and home environment,” and “the possibility of
rehabilitation.” 7 After weighing factors unique to childhood, a court may
reimpose a sentence of life imprisonment only on the “rare” juvenile
convicted of an offense—those deemed “irreparabl[y] corrupt[ed]” or
“irretrievably depraved.” 8
At the sentencing hearing, Melissa Mahabir, a forensic social worker,
testified that Richie Gibbs battled alcoholism and physically abused Mark and
Betty. 9 Richie abused Mark due, in part, to Mark’s struggles in school. 10
Mahabir characterized the violence as a “loop”—“[Mark] got poor grades
because of his home life” and “when he wasn’t able to perform in school and
he had bad grades, that increased the violence that he received.” 11 Betty was
unable to adequately care for Mark as “she was also getting abused in the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

I, along with lawyers and students from the UIC John Marshall Law School Pro Bono
Litigation Clinic, represented Mark Gibbs at his sentencing hearing.
Transcript of Record at 1, 76, People v. Gibbs, Nos. 1992-CF-4, 1992-CF-5 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Gibbs Sentencing Transcript One].
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 1, People v. Gibbs, Nos. 1992-CF-4, 1992-CF-5 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. July 22, 2018).
Id. at 1–2.
Gibbs Sentencing Transcript One, supra note 2, at 14–15.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Id. at 477–78.
Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)); id. at 490 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
Gibbs Sentencing Transcript One, supra note 2, at 2, 115, 136–37.
Id. at 187–88.
Id.
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home and suffered domestic violence.” 12 Mahabir viewed the crimes as
trauma-induced and spurred by adolescent impulse. 13 “Mark wanted the pain
to end,” she testified, “[but] he didn’t see a way out.” 14
Mahabir also described her extensive review of Mark’s prison records
and interviews with correctional officers. 15 Through her investigation, she
discovered that Mark harbors “consistently deep remorse” for the crimes and
“[has] tried to live a life of integrity” in prison. 16 Mahabir was sanguine about
Mark’s postrelease prospects, remarking, “[e]ven the correctional
officers . . . believe that he should be [released].” 17 She concluded, “[o]ne of
them said, ‘He could live down the street from me.’” 18
Despite the mitigating evidence, prosecutors pushed for another life
sentence. 19 With support and guidance from Kim Peppers, a victim advocate
employed by the Union County prosecutor, eight members of Richie Gibbs’s
family gave victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing. 20 Among
them, Gary Gibbs, Richie’s brother, painted a macabre crime scene: Richie
was “laying on the floor . . . cold,” Betty was “blowing bubbles in her own
blood.” 21 Wendy Charles, a cousin, claimed Mark had “quite a giggle in his
talk” when he telephoned her family’s home immediately after the
shootings. 22 Linda Gibbs Samuels, an aunt, cast Mark’s act as “cold, calculated
evil” and alleged that when she visited him in jail, “the first words out of his
mouth was [sic], ‘Surprise, surprise.’” 23 The victim advocate herself read
aloud two statements on behalf of Richie’s family members. 24 None of the
victims’ unsworn statements were otherwise corroborated by evidence in the
record. 25 All implored the judge to impose a life sentence. 26

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 177.
Id. at 139–42.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 142–43.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
Id.
See Transcript of Record at 69, People v. Gibbs, Nos. 1992-CF-4, 1992-CF-5 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Gibbs Sentencing Transcript Two].
See Gibbs Sentencing Transcript One, supra note 2, at 68.
Id.
Id. at 69, 72.
Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 83, 85.
Id. at 60.
See id. at 67, 76, 80.
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Prosecutors never contacted Betty Gibbs’s family about the sentencing
hearing.27 Instead, her survivors learned about their right to give victim impact
statements from Mahabir, the mitigation specialist. At the hearing, Donna
Gibbs, Betty’s younger sister, recalled a “very close” relationship with Betty.28
Donna described her sister as “a Christian [who] would have supported Mark fully
and been there for what he needed.” 29 She wrote, “I believe that Mark knows
what he did was wrong. He is my nephew, and I love him, and I will be here
for him like my sister would have wanted. I would love for him to come home.” 30
Etha Anderson, Betty’s other sister, also offered a statement. 31 She “truly
believe[d]” Mark’s confession on the night of the shootings signaled “the
beginning of his remorse.” 32 Etha remembered that Mark “many years ago in
prison, . . . told [her] he [had] confessed his sins to God.” 33 She concluded, “I
think he will do fine once released. I’m very grateful Mark is having this
opportunity to get an out-of-prison date. I hope it is sooner [rather] than
later.” 34 In a final statement, Mary McWhorter, Betty’s mother, told the court:
I lost my daughter and then my grandson. This whole situation
has been extremely painful, and the prosecutor does not care about
my story. The victim advocate has never reached out to me or my
daughters, and we can’t understand why. We are victims, but we
have forgiven Mark. Our faith tells us to forgive. . . .
Mark is the last piece of my daughter that I have left. I would give
anything in the world to have him out while I’m still here. 35

Jeffrey Farris, the sentencing judge, noted that he was “saddened” by the
prosecutor’s failure to contact Betty’s family but “pleased” that “[they] were
[still] able to make [their] statements.” 36 Farris, a career prosecutor before his

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

Id. at 213.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 206–07.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 211, 213–14; see also Susan A. Bandes, What Are Victim-Impact Statements For?,
ATLANTIC (July 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/whatare-victim-impact-statements-for/492443 [https://perma.cc/XC3T-N9LL] (stating that
“[v]ictims generally draft statements with the help of the prosecutor’s office, whose goals
are not always the victim’s goals. The conflict between the victim and the prosecution is
especially acute for murder victims’ families”).
Gibbs Sentencing Transcript Two, supra note 19, at 1, 107–09.
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election to the bench, 37 stressed his belief in “strict compliance” with the
Illinois Victims Bill of Rights but took no corrective action against the State. 38
Indeed, moments before recondemning Mark to natural life in prison, Farris
expressed incredulity at the notion of victim-offender reconciliation. 39 He
pondered Mary’s “forgiving heart” as “an enigma, a conundrum, a paradox,
to most of us” and admitted, “I cannot unravel that enigma or that paradox
or that conundrum. Folks, it doesn’t add up to me.” 40
The prosecutor’s strategy to deny Betty Gibbs’s family their rights as
victims violated Illinois law. 41 The Illinois Victims Bill of Rights provides for
“the right to [receive] timely notification of” and “to be heard” at sentencing
hearings, the right “to communicate with the prosecution” and have “an
advocate [present]” at sentencing hearings, and “[t]he right to be treated with
fairness” throughout the judicial process. 42 Illinois statutes afford comparable
protections, broadly defining a “victim” and imposing no restrictions on a
statement’s content. 43 Further, the law includes a mandate that “victim
advocate personnel” shall contact victims and lend support to “deal with
trauma, loss and grief.” 44 Yet Farris looked past the State’s breach, save for his
passing condolence to Betty’s family. 45
In light of Farris’s professed incapacity to discern the “forgiving heart,”
one assumes he would not have been moved had the victim-witness
coordinator amassed victims’ pleas for mercy at the expense of impact

37.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Judge Jeffrey Farris had been a prosecutor from 1992 until he was appointed Circuit
Judge in 2015. Press Release, S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of L., Jeffery Farris, Class of ’89,
Appointed Circuit Judge (Jan. 9, 2015), https://law.siu.edu/news/2015/01-09-2015.html
[https://law.siu.edu/news/2015/01-09-2015.html].
Gibbs Sentencing Transcript Two, supra note 19, at 108–09; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
120/4.5(c-5)(5)(A) (2020) (explaining that a court may award “appropriate relief” to
victims denied their right to be heard). While a defendant cannot prevail on appeal of a
violation of victims’ rights laws, the prohibition does not alleviate the trial court’s
responsibility to exercise appropriate discretion at sentencing. People v. Richardson, 751
N.E.2d 1104, 1107–08 (Ill. 2001). Plus, the trial court’s failure to fairly weigh evidence
presented in aggravation and mitigation can violate due process. Cf. People v. Hestand,
838 N.E.2d 318, 325 (Ill. App. 4th 2005) (holding that the admission of a victim-impact
statement did not violate due process, in part because of evidence of aggravation and mitigation).
Gibbs Sentencing Transcript Two, supra note 19, at 135, 137 (“I do believe
that . . . [Mark’s] acts do demonstrate to me clearly . . . irretrievable depravity, whatever
that definition is, or permanent incorrigibility.”).
Id. at 135.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/6 (2020).
ILL. CONST. art. 1 § 8.1(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(11).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5 (2020).
Id. § (b)(3.5).
Id. § (c)(5)(A).
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statements seeking vengeance. 46 Nonetheless, his muted response reveals a
different paradox—that is, the broad language of access, inclusion, and
empowerment for all victims under the Illinois law versus the absence of any
meaningful inroads for those seeking reconciliation.47 The omission is not atypical
among states—and can be traced to the origins of victim impact statements. 48
Laws enacting victim impact statements flourished in the 1980s and 90s,
a period defined by draconian crime control measures and mass
incarceration. 49 In effect, if not in intention, the laws suppress the voices of
victims who forgive their assailants. 50 Presently, though, we are in the midst
of a reckoning with the failed law enforcement strategies of the past four
decades. 51 Essential to criminal justice reform is deescalating punitive
sentencing practices. 52 To that end, advocates and lawmakers have rightly
focused on reforms to mandatory minimum sentences, so-called “three
strikes” laws, and onerous sentencing guidelines. 53 Still, in an emerging era of
decarceration, the effect of victim impact statements on excessive prison
sentences has been largely overlooked. 54

46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

51.

52.
53.
54.

Gibbs Sentencing Transcript Two, supra note 19, at 135.
See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/6(b) (2020) (stating only a
single reference to statements offered in mitigation).
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 6.14 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2016)
[hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G, Tentative Draft 4] (noting that no U.S.
jurisdiction offers a comprehensive statutory structure for restorative justice initiatives).
See James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 20, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-mass-incarceration
[https://perma.cc/4P2U-EAAA] (explaining that the prison population “truly exploded
during President Ronald Reagan’s administration” and continued to grow as a result of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994); see also Shannon M. Sliva
& Carolyn G. Lambert, Restorative Justice Legislation in the American States: A Statutory
Analysis of Emerging Legal Doctrine, 14 J. POL’Y PRAC. 77, 77–78 (2015) (noting the
continued increase in incarceration rates since the 1990s even while crime rates have declined).
See Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant
Allocution, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 473 (2008)
(discussing the “often-inaccurate dichotomy of the innocent and vengeful victim seeking a
harsh punishment for the reprehensible defendant” and the relevance of “circumstances at
sentencing where victims express statements of mercy [or] forgiveness”).
See Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law and What Happens Next,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/KRG6TFFQ].
Id. (stating that “[c]riminal justice reform starts with sentencing reform”).
Id.; see also Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 78 (noting the “shift in response after a
decades-long focus on punitive sentencing” as reflected in reform to drug sentencing polices).
See Jill Lepore, The Rise of the Victims’-Rights Movement, NEW YORKER (May 14, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/the-rise-of-the-victims-rights-movement
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As I propose in this Article, reshaping retributive laws governing victim
impact statements is essential to comprehensive sentencing reform. 55
Specifically, in both structure and substance, victims’ rights laws must
integrate meaningful opportunities for victim-offender reconciliation.56 A
foundational restorative justice technique, victim-offender reconciliation—also
referred to as “mediation” or “conferencing”—brings together a victim and
an offender in a facilitator-guided dialogue. 57 First, victim-offender
reconciliation is integral to landmark revisions to the Model Penal Code
geared to reduce prison populations. Further, victim-offender reconciliation
is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and recent legislative trends
regarding the purpose and admissibility of victim impact statements. Finally,
victim-offender reconciliation embraces the fundamental public policy goals
of victims’ rights laws: to empower and restore dignity to victims, to educate
defendants about the human consequences of their crime, and to fully inform
courts about the crimes’ societal harms. 58
In Part I, I examine the origins of state victims’ rights laws in the era of
mass incarceration. In Part II, I explore recent guidance in the Model Penal
Code proposing principles for presentencing victim-offender reconciliation.
In Part III, I survey state victims’ rights laws to see how, if at all, the laws contemplate
presentence victim-offender reconciliation. In Part IV, I construct a legal and
public policy framework in support of victim-offender reconciliation. Finally,
in Part V, I offer a proposal to strengthen opportunities for presentencing

55.

56.
57.

58.

[https://perma.cc/M352-DK9G] (explaining that, “[i]n a national conversation about
criminal justice reform, the Reagan-to-Clinton-era guidelines for federal sentencing have
been questioned, but the gains of the victims’ rights movement are generally taken for granted”).
Retributive theory holds that the imposition of some form of pain will vindicate, most
frequently deprivation of liberty and even loss of life in some cases. In contrast,
restorative theory argues that “what truly vindicates [victims] is acknowledgement of
[their] harms and needs, combined with an active effort to encourage offenders to take
responsibility, make right the wrongs, and address the causes of their behavior.”
HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 59 (2002). For a broader
discussion, see Mark S. Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert B. Coates & Elizabeth Lightfoot,
Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities
and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 269–71 (2005).
See Umbreit et al., supra note 55, at 269; see also Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 79
(listing “face-to-face” victim-offender dialogues as a common restorative justice practice).
See Umbreit et al., supra note 55. It should be noted that victim-offender dialogue long
predates the U.S. criminal justice system and is traced to Native American peace circles,
Native Hawaiian ho ʻopononpono, and Tswana kgotlas. See RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN
PRACTICE: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 13 (Murphy & Seng eds., 2015).
See Giannini, supra note 50, at 444; Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 77–78 (proposing
restorative justice practices as a method to address the “[v]ictims’ critical needs for
acknowledgement, information, privacy, safety, and involvement” which “remain unmet
by an adversarial justice system”).
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victim-offender reconciliation and to foster equal access to the victims’
statement processes under state victims’ rights laws.

I.

THE EMERGENCE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAWS
IN THE MASS INCARCERATION ERA

On June 27, 1987, police officers discovered the bodies of Charisse
Christopher and her two-year-old daughter, Lacie Jo, stabbed to death on the
kitchen floor of the family’s Millington, Tennessee apartment. 59
Christopher’s three-year-old son, Nicholas, lay nearby bleeding profusely. 60
Charisse was stabbed over eighty times. 61 Lacie Jo sustained fatal wounds to
her chest and abdomen. 62 After seven hours of surgery, Nicholas
“miraculously” survived. 63
Shortly after the attack, a police officer saw Pervis Payne running from
the building “so covered with blood that he appeared to be ‘sweating blood.’” 64
Police later located Payne hiding in an ex-girlfriend’s attic. 65 He had scratches
on his body and blood on his clothing matching the victims’ blood types. 66
An overnight bag containing a bloodstained t-shirt was found in a nearby
dumpster. 67 Investigators matched Payne’s fingerprints to those lifted from
three cans of malt liquor on a table near the bodies. 68
A jury convicted Payne on two counts of first-degree murder and one
count of assault with intent to commit murder. 69 Prosecutors sought the
death penalty. 70 At the sentencing hearing, prosecutors asked Mary Zvolanek,
Charisse’s mother, how the crime affected Nicholas. 71 She responded:
He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t
come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 812–13 (1991).
Id. at 812.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.

Rethinking Victim Impact Statements

311

times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my
Lacie[?] And I tell him yes. He says, I’m worried about my Lacie. 72

Prosecutors highlighted Zvolanek’s testimony in their closing arguments,
telling jurors that Nicholas would never hear his mother “sing him a lullaby”
or “watch cartoons” with his sister again.73 The jury sentenced Payne to death. 74
On appeal, Payne contended that Zvolanek’s testimony violated his
Eighth Amendment right against the “arbitrary” imposition of the death
penalty. 75 He relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Booth v.
Maryland that victim’s statements “may be wholly unrelated” to the
defendant’s blameworthiness and “could divert the jury’s attention away”
from the relevant consideration of the defendant’s own background. 76 The
Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that Zvolanek’s testimony was “technically
irrelevant,” but concluded that the error was harmless. 77
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled in a 5–4 decision that
Zvolanek’s statements were relevant to the jury’s consideration of Payne’s
sentence. 78 In so holding, the Court all but inverted Booth’s logic. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that “like the murderer . . . so
to the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society
and in particular to his family.” 79 Thus, Booth’s wont to turn the victim into
a “faceless stranger” deprives the prosecution from presenting relevant
evidence to a jury determining a capital defendant’s fate. 80 After the Court’s
ruling affirming Payne’s conviction, Zvolanek told a reporter, “[i]t’s four years
ago today that this happened, and we’re still living with it. And in a way, as
the years go by, it just gets harder to deal with.” 81
The advent of victim impact statements predates Payne by over a
decade. 82 The statements became a part of the state sentencing lexicon in the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 814–15.
Id. at 816.
Id.
Id.
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504–05 (1987).
Payne, 501 U.S. at 816–17.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id. (citing South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
High Court Ruling Comforts Family Torn By 2 Murders, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at A15.
Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing
and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 349 (2009); see Lepore, supra note 54 (explaining that
“[t]he movement usually dates its origins to 1975, when, with the aid of the Heritage
Foundation, a lawyer named Frank G. Carrington published a book called ‘The
Victims’”); see also OFF. OF VICTIMS CRIMES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NEW DIRECTIONS FROM
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early 1980s. 83 In 1982, President Ronald Reagan commissioned a task force
on victims of crime. 84 In the report produced by the 1982 Presidential Task
Force on Crime Victims, the chairman’s introductory statement portrayed
violence run amok—“[e]very 23 minutes a person is murdered [and] [e]very
six minutes a woman is raped”—and slammed the “neglect” of crime victims
as “a national disgrace.” 85 The first chapter imagined a brutal rape after which
the “terrified” and “powerless” female victim is mistreated by the justice
system at every turn, taunted by her “smirking” attacker in court, and
ultimately denied an opportunity to speak to the judge about her trauma. 86
The Task Force highlighted that “[v]ictims, no less than defendants, are
entitled to have their views considered” at sentencing hearings. 87 To that end,
the report encouraged courts to allow victims to be heard at hearings and for
legislatures to enact laws “requiring victim impact statements.” 88 On its face,
the language establishing the content of victim impact statements was not
overtly retributive. 89 Rather, the Task Force recommended the sentencing
judge’s consideration “of all financial, social, psychological, and medical
effects on the crime victim.” 90 The information was intended to promote a
“just penalty” and “fair adjudication of the case” for offender and victim
alike. 91 Perhaps owing to the televangelist Pat Robertson’s membership on
the Task Force, the report also called on religious communities to develop
training “on ways to restore [victims’] spiritual and mental health.” 92 As part
of the victims’ healing process, the report encouraged clergy to “listen and pray
and give counsel” in addition to offering emergency food, housing, and clothing. 93

83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

THE FIELD: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (1997) (noting that, in
1980, Wisconsin became the first state to enact a bill of rights for crime victims).
Roberts, supra note 82.
See LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME,
FINAL REPORT (1982); see Victim & Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291,
96 Stat. 1248 (providing for victim impact statements under federal law as part of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982).
HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 84, at vi–vii.
Id. at 4, 7, 11.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 33, 76–78.
See id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 78, 80.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
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In the context of the report’s stark depiction of victimhood, however, the
victim impact statement was, by design, a prosecutorial cudgel. 94 For his part,
Reagan touted the report as a panacea for a collapsing criminal justice
system. 95 In a speech to several thousand cheering police officers, Reagan
expressed regret that he had not authorized more executions as governor of
California and offered a “detailed account of [his] hardline law-enforcement
philosophy.” 96 That philosophy, as embraced and advanced by federal and
state lawmakers, ushered in a decades-long period of mass incarceration. 97
The Task Force also recommended an amendment to the Bill of Rights
to the U.S. Constitution, entitling “the victim, in every criminal prosecution
[to] the right to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial
proceedings.” 98 Though the U.S. Congress never ratified the amendment, the
recommendation gained considerable traction in state legislatures. 99
Beginning in 1982, thirty-two states passed victim-oriented constitutional
amendments. 100 Twenty-two years after the Task Force’s report, its impact
still resonated. In 2004, proponents of a federal constitutional amendment
were successful in winning the passage of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
(CVRA), a comprehensive list of statutory protections—including a victim’s
right to be heard at any hearing involving release, plea, or sentencing. 101
Today, all states allow victims to make a statement at sentencing hearings
Judicial
by way of statute, constitutional amendment, or both. 102
interpretation of the laws invariably focuses on the harm suffered by the
victims at the hand of the defendant. 103 Popular perception—largely driven
by prosecutors and so-called victims’ rights advocates—predictably follows

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

The retributive intent of victim impact statements is supported by the other law
enforcement-oriented recommendations by the task force, including severe restrictions on bail,
increases to mandatory minimum sentences, and parole abolishment. Id. at 17–18, 22.
Howell Raines, Reagan Proposes Revisions of Laws to Combat Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 1981, at A1.
Id.
See Cullen, supra note 49.
HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 84, at 114.
See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611,
614 (2009).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).
Roberts, supra note 82, at 349.
See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (noting that victim
impact statements are “designed to remind the jury that murder has foreseeable consequences
to . . . family members and friends who also suffer harm from murderous conduct”).
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suit. 104 In his 2009 “defense” of victim impact statements, longtime
proponent Paul Cassell offered a “real world example” of a statement. 105
Cassell selected a bereaved parent’s impassioned plea for the “maximum
sentence” for a defendant who unlawfully sold a firearm used to murder “a
young woman in the prime of her life” in a mass shooting. 106 While Cassell’s
endorsement of victim impact statements cites their therapeutic value, he
views catharsis through a lens of retribution. 107 In turn, a statement’s bottomline utility is that “[p]roper punishment . . . [is] meted out” by a sentencing
court. 108
Cassell’s perspective, when coupled with the history behind victims’
rights laws, tells two fundamental truths. First, victim impact statements were
created to increase prison sentences. 109 In turn, victims are effectively
adjuncts to the prosecution. With those truths in mind, victims’ rights laws
have proved understandably resistant to the language of reconciliation. The
still-nascent movement toward sentencing reform, including watershed
legislative guidance in the Model Penal Code, may turn the legislative tide.

II.

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE WEIGHS IN ON VICTIM-OFFENDER
RECONCILIATION

In 2001, the American Law Institute (ALI) launched a project to consider
new sentencing provisions in the Model Penal Code. 110 Over the next fifteen
years, the sentencing project resulted in several additions to the Code,
including updated language as to the general purposes of the sentencing
104. The National Institute of Corrections, an agency of the U.S. Department of Justice,
provides three samples of victim impact statements as a reference for crime victims. All
three samples involve sentencings for violent crimes, including sexual abuse and
domestic assault, at which the victim requested the maximum sentence. Sample Victim
Impact Statements, NAT’L INST. CORR., https://nicic.gov/sample-victim-impactstatements [https://perma.cc/9ERA-7ZEQ] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020); see Judy C. Tsui,
Breaking Free of the Prison Paradigm: Integrating Restorative Justice Techniques Into
Chicago’s Juvenile Justice System, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 655 (2014) (stating
that “it may be hard to convince communities that restorative justice practices properly
address the goals of a criminal justice system” as “the American justice system has
embraced a punitive [sentencing] paradigm”).
105. Cassell, supra note 99, at 616.
106. Id. at 616–18.
107. Id. at 622 (“I got to tell my step-father what he did to me. Now I can get on with my life.”).
108. Id. at 632.
109. Cf. Lepore, supra note 54 (explaining that “[i]n both capital and non-capital cases,
victim-impact evidence has been shown to affect sentencing” and arguing “that’s why
prosecutors introduce it”).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G, Tentative Draft 4, supra note 48, at xiii.
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system, victim compensation and restitution, and consideration of criminal
history in sentencing guidelines.111 As the project neared completion in 2016, its
contributors proposed a new section entitled “Restorative Justice Practices.” 112
The section set forth “principles of legislation to guide the development of laws
regulating the formal use of restorative justice practices within criminal
cases.” 113 It stopped short of “attempt[ing] to legislate” restorative justice
practices but—with an aspirational bent—“encourage[d]” their use “in
appropriate cases.” 114
The ALI proposal defined “restorative justice practices” as “formalized
opportunities for guided dialogue between defendants and crime victims”
designed “to repair harm to crime victims, families, and communities; to
facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding
community; and to increase a sense among victims . . . that their voices [are]
heard and that a fair process has been employed for the resolution of harm.” 115
The section not only endorsed restorative justice practices as a pragmatic
means to facilitate a recommended sentencing disposition but also to advance
more therapeutic ends. 116 Additionally, while the proposal recognized the
utility of restorative justice practices as a “potential alternative to traditional
sentencing” it also noted that the same “inclusive processes” hold value “even
when a traditional sentence is also imposed.” 117 To guard against magnifying
“existing power inequities” between offender and victim or pressuring victims
into “minimizing the seriousness of harms caused to them,” the section
recommended that trained, neutral facilitators participate to “ensure the
moderating influence of a third party” in proposed sentencing outcomes. 118
In April 2017, the ALI presented the draft to its members with two
notable revisions. 119 First, the updated section replaced “Restorative Justice

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id.
Id.
Id. at xxi.
Id.
Id. § 6.14(2)–(3).
See id. § 6.14 cmt. a.
Id. § 6.14 cmt. a; see id. § 6.14(1) (positing that “trial courts should be authorized to make
use of restorative justice practices in criminal cases, either as an alternative to traditional
adjudication or as a supplement to the adjudicative process”).
118. Id. § 6.14 cmt. e, reporter’s note e. But see John Braithwaite, Setting Standards for
Restorative Justice, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 563, 565 (2002) (noting the importance of
avoiding standards for facilitators that “are so prescriptive that they inhibit restorative
justice innovation”).
119. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 6.14(a) reporter’s note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft,
2017) [hereinafter MPC: SENT’G, Proposed Final Draft].
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Practices” with “Victim-Offender Conferencing.” 120 The change sought to
distill the “many meanings” of “restorative justice” into “one of the most
common” restorative justice practices employed in criminal proceedings.121
Secondly, the provision took a more compulsory tack than its predecessor—stating
plainly that the victim-offender conferencing principles “should be advanced
by laws that authorize courts to experiment with the use of victim-offender
conferencing in criminal cases.” 122
As in the previous draft, the section defined victim-offender
conferencing as a “formalized opportunity for guided dialogue between one
or more defendants and crime victims.” 123 Again, it recognized the use of
conferencing “as an opportunity for dialogue that augments, rather than
replaces, traditional sentences.” 124 The drafters emphasized that the
conferencing parameters in the provision—including informed consent by all
participants, involvement of a facilitator, and the right to withdraw—were
designed to “safeguard the rights of defendants and victims, and advance the
purposes of sentencing set forth in the Code.” 125
In May 2017, Model Penal Code: Sentencing won approval, marking the
first revisions to the Code’s sentencing provisions since its creation in 1962. 126
The victim-offender conferencing section, though, reverted to an equivocal
tone, stating that state legislatures should merely “seek to effectuate” the
recommendations when “authorizing such experimentation.” 127 Moreover,
the approved version was relegated to an appendix and included the caveat

120. Id.
121. Id. reporter’s note a; see Memorandum From Reporters Kevin R. Reitz & Cecilia M.
Klingele to the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Council (Dec. 16, 2013) (“After
considering the comments made at the [2016 Council] meeting, along with subsequent
conversations with Council members, the provision has been redrafted with a focus on
one category of restorative justice: victim-offender conferences.”).
122. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G app. A (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017)
(explaining that the proposed final draft returned to a more neutral stance and that the
provision was not “drafted in the form of formal legislation” and set forth principles that
a legislature should “seek to effectuate when authorizing . . . experimentation with the
use of victim-offender conferencing”).
123. Id. § 6.14 cmt. a.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Prof. Kevin R. Reitz Leads Massive 15-Year American Law Institute Sentencing Project, UNIV.
MINN. L. SCH. (May 5, 2017), https://www.law.umn.edu/news/2017-05-25-prof-kevin-r-reitzleads-massive-15-year-american-law-institute-sentencing-project [https://perma.cc/2Q2W5TBZ] [hereafter American Law Institute Sentencing Project].
127. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 6.16 (AM. L. INST., Official Statutory Text, 2017)
[hereinafter MPC: SENT’G, Official Statutory Text]. The official text notes that “[t]his
Section was numbered Section 614 in the pre-approval drafting process.” Id. § 6.16 n.62.
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that “[t]he Institute does not advance a specific legislative scheme for
experimentation with the use of victim-offender conferencing, nor is the
provision drafted in the form of model legislation.” 128
A press release accompanying Model Penal Code: Sentencing described
the project as emblematic of a philosophical change in sentencing practices
since the Code’s original publication. 129 The guide addressed “some of the
most important issues that courts, corrections systems, and policymakers are
facing today,” including the rights of crime victims. 130 Kevin Reitz, the
project’s principal drafter since its beginnings, said the report’s central
purpose is to offer “workable solutions to problems of mass punitiveness
that have grown since the 1970s.” 131 In explaining “mass punitiveness,”
Reitz commented:
While [the U.S. is] the undisputed leader in incarceration rates
worldwide, we suffer from much more than “mass incarceration.”
It would be more accurate to say that we have blundered into mass
punishment of all kinds. Internationally, America is in the highest
tier of harsh justice with our astonishingly high probation supervision
rates, intrusive and counterproductive probation conditions,
crushing economic penalties, uncountable collateral consequences
of conviction, outsized parole supervision rates, and massive
revocations of people from community supervision into our prisons
and jails. 132

Though Model Penal Code: Sentencing rightly functions to rebuke the
harsh crime control measures endemic to the Reagan era, the victim-offender
conferencing provision shares a fundamental goal with the 1982 Presidential
Task Force on Crime Victims: to “increase a sense among victims and
offenders that their views have been heard through a fair process.” 133 To that
end, Model Penal Code: Sentencing cites the influence of the Task Force in the
ascendency of victims’ advocacy groups and “the return of the victim to
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. § 6.16.
American Law Institute Sentencing Project, supra note 126.
Id.
Id.; see Hon. Joan Gottschall & Molly Armour, Rethinking the War on Drugs: What
Insights Does Restorative Justice Offer?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN PRACTICE, supra note
57, at 83.
132. Kevin R. Reitz, New Model Penal Code for Criminal Sentencing Approved by the American
Law Institute: Comprehensive Reform Recommendations for State Legislatures, UNIV. MINN.:
ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. (June 5, 2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/newsviews/new-model-penal-code-criminal-sentencing-approved-american-law-institutecomprehensive [https://perma.cc/FVZ2-QYUX].
133. MPC: SENT’G, Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, reporter’s note a.
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[center] stage in criminal justice policy.” 134 Still, the revisions were written on
a “clean slate” as the Code’s original incarnation did not consider the role of
victims in the criminal justice process. 135 As such, the “slate’s” essential
inscriptions on the role of victims at sentencing invoke the Code’s bedrock
sentencing objectives: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.136 In concert, the section endeavors to synthesize the “freestanding”
interests of crime victims popularized in the 1980s—”empowerment,” “dignity,”
and “vindication”—with the traditional goals of sentencing to achieve “a consistent
framework for resolving [victims’ rights] questions throughout the Code.” 137

III.

THE RESISTANCE OF STATE VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAWS
TO RESTORATIVE PRACTICES

The Model Penal Code’s outsize influence on the structure, substance,
and interpretation of state criminal laws is beyond question. 138 Model Penal
Code: Sentencing emerged from years of discourse and debate. 139 Nonetheless,
a survey of state victims’ rights laws shows that victim-offender reconciliation
has yet to make a faint legislative imprint.
To be sure, many states incorporate aspects of restorative justice into
components of criminal or juvenile justice codes. 140 In various facets, the
language of restorative justice in state laws shares Model Penal Code:
Sentencing’s “experimental” dimensions. 141 References are broad and general
in state codes, “but with few mandates and little structure to support systemic

134. Id. at 597, app. B n.154 (citing DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CRIME CONTROL: CRIME
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 11–12 (2001)).
135. Id. at 597, app. B. In a 1960 address on sentencing in the Model Penal Code, Herbert
Wechsler, the Code’s chief architect, did not reference victims’ rights—aside from a
reference to the right to compensation and restitution. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing,
Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 472 n.14 (1961).
136. MPC: SENT’G, Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, at 597, app. B.
137. Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G, at xxiii (AM. L. INST., Council Draft No. 6, 2017).
138. See Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 327 (2007).
139. MPC: SENT’G, Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, at xxiii (explaining the addition of a
separate Reporter’s Memorandum on victims’ rights in a model sentence system because
“these questions are difficult and produce strong differences of opinion”).
140. See Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 88 (observing that “[w]hile many states’ criminal
and juvenile codes contain references to restorative justice generally or specific restorative
justice practices, few provide detailed support and structure to ensure implementation”).
141. MPC: SENT’G, Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, app. A; see Sliva & Lambert, supra
note 49 (noting that state legislation often gives “general statements of support” for
restorative justice practices).
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use.” 142 As a consequence, the “intent, implementation, and impact” of
restorative justice practices is dubious, even in the most progressive jurisdictions. 143
Colorado, a forerunner in restorative justice legislation, has thirty-seven
statutes referencing restorative justice practices—four times more than every
state but Vermont. 144 Its victims’ rights law entitles affected populations to
information about “restorative justice practices, which includes victim-offender
conferences.” 145 The law, however, merely requires victims to receive
information about the “possibility” of restorative justice practices without
additional guidance, instruction, or definition. 146 Additionally, a model state
victim impact statement template fails to reference reconciliation but instead
advises victims to “include things like fear and lifestyle changes” as effects of
the crime. 147
The Colorado process highlights another obstacle to victim-offender
reconciliation. Like most states, the law requires the prosecutor to contact
victims. 148 As a result, the “victim-witness” coordinators (or “directors” in
Colorado) tasked with outreach are employed by the district attorney’s
office. 149 The directors’ affiliation and responsibilities render restorative
justice an outlier. A recent job posting describes duties such as assisting
prosecutors in “case preparation and problem solving with witnesses,”
scheduling witness interviews with prosecutors, and “inform[ing]

142. Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 77, 88, 92–93 (indicating that, through the results of a
study of thirty-two states with statutory support for the use of restorative justice, few
states “provide detailed support and structure to ensure implementation” of restorative
justice laws and that many laws are “open-ended” and are subject to interpretation). The
Virginia victim-offender reconciliation statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.4 (2010),
exemplifies this point, providing that “any Crime Victim and Witness Assistance
Program may establish a victim-offender reconciliation program.” Id. § 19.2-11.4(a)
(emphasis added).
143. Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 92. The jurisdictions I define as “progressive”—Colorado,
Vermont, Texas, and Montana—are four of the seven states that “have structured
support for a restorative justice practice.” Id. at 88.
144. Id. at 86 (stating that Vermont has twenty-one statutes addressing restorative justice).
145. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5(l.5) (2016).
146. Id.; see Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 91 (observing that “there is no way to know
how [victim-offender meeting] programs are structured” based on statutory language alone).
147. Victim Impact Statement, 5TH JUD. DIST. ATT’Y, https://www.da5.us/wp-content/uploads/
2011/02/Victim_Impact_Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HVX-CZNA] (last visited Oct.
14 2020).
148. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-303(11)(g) (2016).
149. Victim Witness Directors, COLO. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY (Jan. 2019), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/
ovp/VRA/DA-victim-witness-directors.pdf [https://perma.cc/83DH-AK3M].
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[prosecutors] of any potential witness problems.”150 The over one thousand–word
description does not reference restorative justice practices. 151
Vermont, also a legislative leader in restorative justice, established an
innovative probation program in 1995 to “steer[] adult criminals convicted of
minor and non-violent offenses away from jail” and toward reparative
outcomes crafted by affected communities. 152 Today, the state department of
corrections funds restorative justice centers in every county, including reentry
programs for individuals convicted of crimes and deemed high risk. 153
Nonetheless, Vermont’s victims’ rights laws make no mention of
opportunities for reconciliation. 154 The operative statute provides victims the
right to appear at sentencing and “express reasonably his or her views
concerning the crime,” including the need for restitution. 155 The laws lack
guidance as to what constitutes a “reasonable” view of the crime. 156 Like
Colorado, Vermont’s victim assistance programs are operated through
prosecutors’ offices. 157 One website includes general information about

150. Off. Dist. Att’y 18th Jud. Dist., Victim Witness Specialist, ZIPRECRUITER (May 15, 2020),
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/c/Office-of-the-District-Attorney-18th-Judicial-District/Job/
Victim-Witness-Specialist/-in-Englewood,CO?jid=0ab968010b83fd2c [https://perma.cc/QJ23MZGJ].
151. Id.
152. Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 86 (stating that Vermont has over twice as many laws
referencing restorative justice than the next highest states, Montana and Texas); Reparative
Probation, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/reparative-probation
[https://perma.cc/DLF7-95HG] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020); Court Diversion, VT. CT. DIVERSION,
http://vtcourtdiversion.org/court-diversion [https://perma.cc/37CK-U789] (last visited June
30, 2020).
153. Christopher Gernon, Vermont’s Criminal Justice System: Restorative Justice, MIDDLEBURY
CAMPUS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://middleburycampus.com/38029/local/vermonts-criminaljustice-system-restorative-justice [https://perma.cc/Z5ZH-8GWS] (reporting on the Circle of
Support and Accountability, a reentry program “available following their served prison time” to
individuals convicted of crimes and deemed high-risk).
154. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5304 (2015).
155. Id. § 5321(a)(2).
156. As an example, a template for victim impact statements in juvenile adjudications
advises victims to describe “the impact that this incident has had on you as the victim,
including any physical injuries, emotional impact, and physical damage.” Victim
Impact Statement and Request Form, VT. JUDICIARY, https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/
sites/default/files/documents/Form%20112.pdf [https://perma.cc/T949-AJTN] (last
visited July 5, 2020).
157. Vermont Victim Assistance Program, VT. CTR. FOR CRIME VICTIM SERVS, http://
www.ccvs.vermont.gov/support-for-victims/victim-assistance-program [https://perma.cc/
VWH4-NMW4] (last visited July 6, 2020) (stating that “the [Victim Assistance Program] serves
every county in Vermont with twenty-seven State’s Attorneys victim advocates devoted to
serving crime victims’ needs”).
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restorative justice before advising victims to “call your local law enforcement
agency” to find out more. 158
Texas, a state more well known for executions than enlightened
sentencing policy, is an unlikely restorative justice vanguard. 159 In 2001, the
state enacted legislation providing for victim-offender mediation. 160 In
contrast to other mediation programs past or present, the program extends to
individuals convicted of violent crimes—those whose conduct “caused bodily
injury or death to victims.” 161 Notably, the process requires the victim, the
offender, and a volunteer mediator to undergo at least one hundred hours of
training before the first meeting. 162 The mediations are then coordinated by
three fulltime Texas Department of Criminal Justice staff working with the
mediators. 163 In 2005, an evaluation reported “all available barometers
indicate that [the program] has been a success.” 164 Surveys revealed that 97
percent of the participants in 187 mediations were satisfied with the process
and some 80 percent reported “major life changes as a result.” 165 The
evaluation also highlighted the therapeutic value of the mediations, observing
that “victims’ families did not excuse the crime[s], but were able to ease their
feelings of anger and vengeance.”166 Additionally, offenders gained self-esteem
through “a sense that they were able to provide some measure of
compensation to the victim” and accrued fewer disciplinary violations after
participating in the program. 167
Despite the unqualified success of the Texas program, the onus remains
on victims to independently seek out mediation. 168 A victim has the right to
“request” mediation, but the Texas Department of Criminal Justice has no
affirmative obligation to inform victims of the program or outline its

158. Vermont Criminal Justice Process—Adults, ESSEX VT., https://essex.org/336/VermontCriminal-Justice-Process—Adult [https://perma.cc/KFQ9-74ZW] (last visited July 5, 2020).
159. See Sliva & Lambert, supra note 49, at 86.
160. MARC LEVIN, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN PRACTICE: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 5, 12–13 (2005).
161. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13(1) (West 2001); see also LEVIN, supra note 160, at 13
(noting that the requests for mediation “have come primarily from victims of violent crime”).
162. See LEVIN, supra note 160, at 13 (“Preparation is central to the program.”); Sliva &
Lambert, supra note 49, at 86.
163. LEVIN, supra note 160, at 13.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.02(a)(11) (West 2015).
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contours. 169 The program’s origins, as recounted in a Texas Public Policy
Foundation report, bear this out:
Three women who were victims of violent crime are largely
responsible for [the program]: Cathy Phillips, Raven Kazen and
Ellen Halbert. When Phillips asked for a meeting with her
daughter’s killer in 1990, officials denied the request, but Phillips saw
a television program on victim-offender mediation. She then contacted
Ellen Halbert, herself a victim of violent crime who then served on
the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, and [Texas Department of
Criminal Justice] Victim Services Division Director Raven Kazen,
who continues to serve in that position today. The Victim Offender
Mediation/Dialogue program resulted from their joint efforts . . .
. 170

Like other states, the Texas victim impact statement template fails to
reference reconciliation, instead encouraging victims to “explain your feelings
such as loss, frustration, fear, [and] anger, as well as any physical or monetary
damages due to the crime.” 171 A brochure produced by the Texas Department
of Corrections, titled “It’s Your Voice,” highlights the importance of victim
impact statements to prosecutions. 172 In essence, the Texas victim-offender
mediation language is, as in other jurisdictions, largely additive to a
retribution-focused law crafted in the wake of the Reagan-era Task Force. 173
At least one state, Montana, appears to be trending away from restorative
justice after auspicious beginnings. In 2001, the state created the Montana
Office of Restorative Justice, “intended to . . . encourage community and victim
participation in the criminal justice process” by “promoting and supporting
practices, policies, and programs that focus on repairing the harm of
crime.” 174 Among other initiatives, the law funded educational programs,
technical assistance to law enforcement and court officers, victim counseling,
mediation training, and “a repository for resources and information to

169. Id. arts. 56.03(c), 56.04(a) (explaining that, in Texas, as in most other states, Victim
Assistance Coordinators are employed by prosecutors’ offices).
170. LEVIN, supra note 160, at 12 (footnote omitted).
171. Victim Impact Statement Packet, TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST. (Sept. 2019), https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/
documents/Victim_Impact_Statement_Packet_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK26-8E8T].
172. VICTIM SERVS. DIV., TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT BROCHURE (2019),
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/Its_Your_Voice.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8FY-YDGQ].
173. The Texas Crime Victim Clearinghouse’s official report to the 71st Legislature provides
a broader look at the history of the Texas Victim’s Rights Law. See TEX. CRIME VICTIM
CLEARINGHOUSE, CRIME VICTIM IMPACT (1989).
174. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-2013(3)(a)–(b) (2001).
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coordinate expertise in restorative justice.” 175 Last year, the legislature
amended the law and moved the state’s restorative justice programs to the
Montana Board of Crime Control. 176 The amended language positions
restorative justice as a budget-minded alternative to the “extremely high cost”
of “incarcerating offenders.” 177 Under the new law, restorative justice “means
criminal justice practices that . . . hold offenders directly accountable to the
people and communities they have harmed.” 178 The law does not provide any
specific initiatives but authorizes the Board of Crime Control to pursue
federal funding for “the purposes of this section.” 179
When calculated in legislative years, the Model Penal Code’s guidance
on victim-offender reconciliation is in its infancy. Still, the early indicators of
its integration into victims’ rights laws are not promising. Opportunities for
victim-offender reconciliation are mostly abstractions in—if not altogether
absent from—state codes. 180 Further, in both substance and procedure, the
laws remain anchored in the language of retribution. More problematically,
the advisory nature of the Code’s legislative guidance, its consignment to an
appendix, and its emphasis on “experimental” use fall well short of a clarion
call for reform. The final revisions reflect a necessary compromise of
divergent views of victims’ roles in the sentencing process. 181 The section’s
circumspect tone, however diplomatic, is not evidence that victim-offender
reconciliation is novel, untested, or legally tenuous—the presentencing
equivalent of an investigational drug. Rather, its principles and objectives
strengthen the law and policy at the core of the victims’ rights movement.

IV. A LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
FOR VICTIM-OFFENDER RECONCILIATION
Victim-offender reconciliation aligns with Payne, the Supreme Court
case upholding the admissibility of victim impact statements at sentencing. 182
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. § 2-15-13(4)(a)–(d).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-7-301 (2019).
Id.
Id. § 44-7-302(2).
Id. § 44-7-302(4)(a).
I have catalogued state-by-state information for four categories: (1) availability of
victim-offender reconciliation, (2) whether victim outreach is conducted by the
prosecutor, (3) whether victim advocates are employed by the prosecutor, and (4)
whether neutral facilitators are utilized for victim-offender reconciliation. I have this
information on file and it is available on request.
181. MPC: SENT’G, Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, at xxiii.
182. Tennessee v. Payne, 501 U.S. 808, 826–27 (1991).
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The Court’s rationale hinged on the admissibility of victim impact statements
in the name of relevance and fair play. 183 Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that
just as the defendant’s background and character is generally relevant at
sentencing so, too, is “evidence about the victim and about the impact of the
murder on the victim’s family.” 184 Invoking Justice Cardozo, Rehnquist
concluded that the “concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed
to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.” 185 Justice O’Connor endorsed
Rehnquist’s application of an evidentiary threshold to determine the
admissibility of victim impact statements. 186 In a separate concurrence,
Justice Souter expressed concerns over equity, writing that “sentencing
without . . . evidence of victim impact may be seen as a significantly
imbalanced process.” 187 Dissenting, Justice Stevens rejected the proposition
that a criminal prosecution requires an equal balance between the state and
the defendant. 188 The criminal justice system, he observed, is designed to
protect the criminal defendant from “the State’s overreaching,” as reflected by
its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and rules of evidence limiting
the use of certain evidence at trial. 189
Payne’s low evidentiary threshold to admit victim impact evidence
coupled with its expansive view of fairness easily accommodates
reconciliation-oriented statements.
First, like retributive statements,
expressions of forgiveness may be evaluated against a relevance standard
and—if admitted—should be treated by states no “differently than other kinds
of relevant evidence.” 190 Secondly, if equity demands a balance between
evidence presented by both “the accused and accuser,” the same principal
guides equal accommodation of accusers pursuing reconciliation over
retribution. 191 To encourage access for one victim versus another “narrow[s]”
the “concept of fairness” that Payne seeks to broaden. 192 Finally, in
recognition of the Stevens dissent, opportunities for victim-offender
reconciliation protect against prosecutorial overreaching by inviting a
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 827.
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).
See id. at 831 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Given that victim impact evidence is
potentially relevant, nothing in the Eighth Amendment commands that States treat it
differently than other kinds of relevant evidence.”).
Id. at 839 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 827 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 839.
Id. at 827.
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multitude of views and voices, not just those enlisted to buttress the State’s
As currently constructed, the impediments to
penal interests. 193
reconciliation in victims’ rights laws undermine rather than advance Payne’s
rationale. An enhanced victims’ rights model freed of those obstacles,
however, will enliven the Court’s ambitious goal to “keep the balance true.” 194
Moreover, victim-offender reconciliation advances legislative trends
toward criminal justice reform. In 2018, Congress passed the Formerly
Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person
(FIRST STEP) Act—“the most substantial criminal justice legislation reform
in a generation.” 195 The law’s evolution is noteworthy, especially in an age of
partisan rancor. In 2015, Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley, a Republican and
“longtime hardliner on criminal justice policy,” and Democrat Senator
Richard Durbin of Illinois cosponsored the Sentencing Reform and
Corrections Act (SRCA). 196 The legislation signaled a marked philosophical
shift away from costly and retribution-focused crime control, chiefly among
Reagan acolytes. 197 The impetus for change varied across party lines with
budgetary concerns, interests in personal liberty, and consideration of “the
moral and spiritual dimensions” of mass incarceration all cited as bases for
reform. 198 Nonetheless, the turnabout generated bipartisan support for a new
193. See id. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 827. In the same vein, while the Payne majority did not discuss due process in the
context of mitigation, the Court noted that a defendant may raise a due process challenge
if victim impact evidence is “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally
unfair.” Id. at 809. It follows that the statutory availability of victim-offender reconciliation
responds to due process concerns and, in practice, may benefit prosecutorial interests by
establishing that a defendant had an avenue for pursuing reconciliation.
195. Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person
Act or the FIRST STEP Act, S. 2795, 115th Cong. (2018); Tim Lau, Historic Criminal
Justice Legislation Signed Into Law, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/historic-criminal-justice-reformlegislation-signed-law [https://perma.cc/9YJW-HQUH].
196. S. 2123 (114th): Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, GOVTRACK (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2123/summary [https://perma.cc/RF4T-ALY5];
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).
197. Agency Perspective: Hearing on Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2014 Before the Subcomm.
on Over-Criminalization of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 65 (2014) (statement
of David E. Patton, Exec. Dir., Fed. Defenders of N.Y.) [hereinafter Patton Statement],
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/4003006d-4aa4-4ee9-b298-1ba73d0e3a55/pattontestimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/8THK-6DCH]; Bill Keller, Prison Revolt, NEW YORKER
(June 22, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/prison-revolt
[https://perma.cc/QP2A-HA53].
198. Patton Statement, supra note 197, at 1 (“Conservatives denounce the unnecessary and
unwise fiscal costs, the assault on personal liberty, and the harshness of a system that
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approach to sentencing. While the legislation only addressed federal inmates,
pundits predicted its passage would “provide a momentum boost for reform
advocates and spur states to look at similar legislation.” 199 Despite broad
support, the bill stalled in the U.S. Senate after facing opposition from a group
led by then-Senator Jeff Sessions. 200
The FIRST STEP Act originated in early 2018 as the Prison Reform and
Redemption Act, a bill that provided measures to improve federal prison
conditions but did little to address policies that contribute to mass
incarceration. 201 In November 2018, a bipartisan Senate coalition brokered a
“breakthrough” compromise to integrate key provisions from the SRCA into
the new bill. 202 Among other reforms imported from the SRCA, the amended
legislation shortened mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug
offenses, eased a rule imposing a life sentence for three or more convictions,
and expanded the so-called “safety-valve” to give judges more discretion to
deviate from mandatory minimums when sentencing for nonviolent drug
offenses. 203 The revamped bill also expanded job training, bolstered early
release programs, and took additional measures designed to reduce
recidivism rates. 204 On December 17, 2018, the FIRST STEP Act received
“overwhelming approval” from the Senate. 205 President Donald Trump
signed the bill into law three days later, touting it as “legislation that will
reduce crime while giving our fellow citizens a chance at redemption.” 206

199.
200.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

has become unmoored from foundational religious principles such as redemption and
mercy.”); see also Keller, supra note 197 (reporting that Patrick Nolan, a former
Republican congressman who served twenty-five months in prison for racketeering, says
“human dignity” is the driving force for change after witnessing the lack of emphasis on
inmate education, job training, and other rehabilitative programs).
S. 2123 (114th): Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, supra note 196.
Lau, supra note 195. The bill failed despite cosponsorship by Senators John Cornyn (RTX), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Mike Lee (R-Utah), Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.),
Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.) and Tim Scott
(R-S.C.). See Statement of Paulette Brown, President, American Bar Association Re: The
Senate’s Introduction of the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, ABA (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2015/10/statement-ofpaulette-brown-president-american-bar-association [https://perma.cc/X2P7-4NN3].
See id.
Grawert & Lau, supra note 51.
See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. §§ 101–07 (2015).
See Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2018, at A1.
Id.
President Donald J. Trump Is Committed to Building on the Successes of the First Step Act,
WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEETS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-committed-building-successes-first-step-act [https://
perma.cc/QJ7K-2TW6].
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In terms of sentencing reform, the FIRST STEP Act is just that—an
encouraging but modest incursion into the prison-industrial bulwark. The
law fell short of more ambitious benchmarks in the SRCA aimed at mass
incarceration and systemic sentencing disparities. 207 Still, when passed, the
law was widely viewed as an historic moment that “shifted the debate in a way
that could set the stage for additional changes.” 208 At its core, the FIRST STEP
Act is intended to lower prison populations by promoting sentencing
proportionality and reducing recidivism. 209 Opportunities for victimoffender reconciliation serve both ends. Notably, the Act endeavors to reduce
recidivism using an evidence-based approach—through activities that have
“been shown through empirical evidence to reduce recidivism or is based on
research indicating that it is likely to be effective in reducing recidivism.” 210
The Act’s list of activities with empirical support includes “victim impact
classes or other restorative justice programs.” 211 In terms of sentencing
proportionality, victim-offender reconciliation can implicate a sentencing
court’s evaluation of the “entire package of legal sanctions that a criminal defendant
will face,” including punishment, postrelease supervision, and restitution. 212
Victim-offender reconciliation also squares with sentencing reform at
the state level. Like federal prison sentences, state sentences are excessively
long. 213 Worse still, longer prison sentences often increase recidivism rates and
have negligible effects on public safety.214 Victim-offender reconciliation can have

207. See Fandos, supra note 204.
208. Id.
209. See Patti Saris, The First Step Act Is A Major Step For Sentencing Reform, LAW360 (Apr.
28, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1153056/the-first-step-act-is-a-major-stepfor-sentencing-reform [https://perma.cc/MP62-JLB3].
210. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW 1 n.2
(2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45558 [https://perma.cc/2F2V-4VJ4].
211. Id.
212. Kevin R. Reitz & Cecelia M. Klingele, Model Penal Code: Sentencing—Workable Limits
on Mass Punishment, 48 CRIM. & JUST. 255, 273 (2019) (stating that a proportionality
analysis under the Model Penal Code “must be applied” to all facets of a criminal
sentence, including collateral consequences).
213. JAMES AUSTIN, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, JAMES CULLEN & JONATHAN FRANK, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 17 (2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_Unnecessarily_Incarcerated_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P2L-PKYX].
214. See LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 14 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/
Report_Criminal%20Justice%20Agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP3Z-RQVW].

328

68 UCLA L. R EV. DISC. 302 (2020)

salutary effects on state sentencing proportionality, too—especially with respect to
serious crimes that make up almost 60 percent of the prison population. 215
Looking forward, the nonpartisan Brennan Center for Justice
encourages states to pass laws “that reward prosecutors’ offices [when they]
reduce crime and incarceration together.” 216 Codifying standards around
alternatives to incarceration reflect “the changing perspective of the role of a
prosecutor” and can reward prosecutors who “prioritize seeking
rehabilitation over simply seeking convictions.” 217 To that end, opportunities
for victim-offender reconciliation facilitate appropriate offender-specific
alternatives, including probation, community service, counseling, or
treatment. Further, alternative sanctions hold offenders accountable while
more effectively reducing recidivism, even in cases involving felony
offenses. 218 The bond forged during victim-offender reconciliation intensifies
accountability, as the sentence is a manifestation of the victim’s expressions
of mercy. 219
A case involving a brutal jail assault exemplifies this dynamic: On July 5,
2005, Jim Loftis, a sheriff’s deputy at a jail in rural Tennessee, participated in
an attack on a detained person, Ricky Beaty. 220 The previous evening, police
arrested Beaty for a domestic assault. 221 A jail lieutenant knew Beaty’s alleged
victim and sought revenge. 222 He ordered Loftis to enlist two fellow detained
persons to beat Beaty. 223 Loftis followed the directive. 224 Loftis then watched
with other deputies as Beaty was taken to a common area where the two
detained persons converged on him from behind. 225 The detained persons
repeatedly struck Beaty in the head, causing injuries. 226 As medics attended

215. Id. (including the following serious crimes: aggravated assault, murder, nonviolent
weapons offenses, robbery, serious burglary, and serious drug trafficking).
216. Id. at 4; see id. at 25 (citing a successful 2009 Illinois program to provide some counties
with additional dollars if they sent 25 percent fewer probationers to prison).
217. Id. at 26.
218. Cf. id. at 12.
219. ZEHR, supra note 55, at 16 (noting that individuals convicted of crimes need
accountability that encourages empathy and responsibility).
220. Sentencing Memorandum at 5, United States v. Loftis, No. 2:05-0007 (M.D. Tenn. Feb.
12, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Loftis Sentencing Memorandum].
221. Id. at 5–6.
222. Id. at 6.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 6–7.
226. Id. at 7.
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to Beaty, the deputies rewarded his attackers with cake and coffee in the
employee break room. 227
Following his arrest, Loftis expressed remorse for his role in the attack. 228
He pleaded guilty and faced a prison sentence of up to twenty years. 229 Weeks
before his sentencing, Loftis, through his defense counsel, arranged for a
meeting with Beaty.230 Beaty accepted, and the communications that followed
resulted in a remarkable encounter at Loftis’s sentencing hearing. At the hearing,
Loftis—not the prosecution—called Beaty as a witness.231 Beaty testified that Loftis
offered a “very sincere” apology to him after the two met.232 Beaty later learned that
Loftis was a single father raising three sons.233 Asked if Loftis should go to prison,
Beaty replied:
If I had my way about it, I would ask the judge to give Mr. Loftis
probation until his youngest son turns 18. Give a man a chance to
raise his children. I know what this has done to mine, the two
youngest ones, [over] the past 24 months. And I was there for them,
their mother was there for them. The Court may think it’s wrong
of me to ask that Mr. Loftis only receive probation, but that’s how
my heart feels. I’ve got to live with my conscience. 234

Despite the prosecutor’s request for a sentence of imprisonment, the
court imposed three years of supervised release.235 Loftis successfully completed
the term. 236
Beyond legislative reforms, the Loftis case embodies the baseline public
policy objectives of the victims’ rights movement. When Loftis addressed the
227. Id.
228. Id. at 5.
229. Transcript of Proceedings at 18, United States v. Loftis, No. 2:05-00007 (M.D. Tenn. May
14, 2007) [hereinafter Loftis Transcript of Proceedings].
230. Loftis Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 220, at 10.
231. Loftis Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 229, at 17.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 19; see also Jeff Latimer, Craig Dowden & Danielle Muise, The Effectiveness of
Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis, 85 PRISON J. 127, 136 (2005) (concluding
that victims and offenders who participate in restorative justice programs are more
satisfied with their case outcomes than those whose cases are adjudicated through
traditional criminal justice practices).
235. Loftis Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 229, at 28. Loftis was briefly jailed after his
arrest. Thus, the sentence he received was, in technical terms, supervised release. The
main difference between probation and supervised release is that probation is served
instead of incarceration, while supervised release is served after release from
incarceration. For both supervised release and probation, the client will be supervised
by a probation officer.
236. See Criminal Docket, United States v. Loftis, No. 2:05-00007 (M.D. Tenn.).
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court before his sentence was imposed, he cited Beaty’s empathy as central to his
appreciation of the crime’s impact on both families and his desire “to the best of
my ability, to make this right.” 237 From the counterperspective, the
reconciliation empowered Beaty—himself accused in a different assault—to
reveal compassion and humanity. 238 Finally, in justifying the sentence against
Loftis, the court made clear that Beaty’s forgiveness was instructive. 239
In large part, the policy justifications for reconciliation-oriented victim
impact statements match or exceed those directed toward statements in
retribution. First, despite critiques of restorative practices as impractical or
ineffective, their value has been studied more rigorously “than almost any
other criminal-justice intervention.” 240 An oft-cited refrain of the victims’
rights movement embraces the “healing” power of impact statements. 241 The
parlance of the movement also invokes “closure,” as if the victim impact
statement functions as an epilogue to the crime. 242 Still, the notions of
“healing” and “closure” ostensibly made real through victim impact
statements oversimplify the complex, arduous, and individualized process of
recovery. 243 Inasmuch as Mary Zvolanek’s statement served as a defining
moment in the victims’ rights movement, her reaction to the Supreme Court’s
favorable ruling in Payne—“as the years go by, it just gets harder to deal
with”—undercuts one of the movement’s core precepts. 244 As Linda Mills, the
Executive Director of the NYU Center on Violence and Recovery, argues, “the
societal goals of punishment and accountability and the individual desire for
healing are not mutually exclusive.” 245 The sine qua non of the relationship,
however, is not retribution. To the contrary, victims who pursue
reconciliation “feel a significant reduction in fear and a significant increase in

237. Loftis Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 229, at 30; see also Giannini, supra note 50,
at 444 (discussing goals of victim impact statements).
238. See Giannini, supra note 50, at 444.
239. See id.; Loftis Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 229, at 31–32.
240. Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice as Evidence-Based
Sentencing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS 22, 23 (Joan
Petersila & Kevin Reitz eds., 2012) (opining that “[m]ost criticisms of [restorative justice]
are moral rather than causal, despite morally driven efforts to portray [it] as ‘impractical’
for causal reasons”).
241. See Cassell, supra note 99, at 621.
242. See U.S. ATTY’S OFF.: MIDDLE DIST. OF PA., VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS: KNOW YOUR
RIGHTS (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-mdpa/legacy/2012/01/17/
Impact%20Statements%20restitution.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VZW-B9UU].
243. See Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal the Violence of Crime,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 462 (2006).
244. High Court Ruling Comforts Family Torn By 2 Murders, supra note 81.
245. Mills, supra note 243, at 458.
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their sense of security.” 246 Moreover, as personified by Beaty’s revelatory
testimony at Loftis’s sentencing hearing, “restoration in the justice
process . . . has the potential to reduce the propensity of victims to become
victimizers.” 247 Most critically, from their origins, victim impact statements
were envisioned as a means to help victims regain autonomy and restore “a
sense of self.” 248 Of course, victim-offender reconciliation invariably runs
counter to prosecutorial aims and, perhaps, to the retributory interest of the “public
at large.” 249 In this light, statements steeped in mercy evince the ultimate act
of agency. 250

V.

A PROPOSAL TO RESHAPE STATE VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAWS

Victims’ rights laws emerged from a movement less motivated by access
to justice than by “an addiction to mass incarceration.” 251 Then, as now, “[t]he
consensual process of restorative justice . . . stands in sharp contrast to the
current adversarial proceedings of our federal and state criminal justice
systems.” 252 Therefore, ensuring meaningful access to and protection under
the laws for all victims requires more than merely adding reconciliation-oriented
language to existing statutes. Rather, a shift toward a restorative model
requires a “dramatic change” from structures and processes that embolden
only those victims seeking retributive justice and toward a more inclusive
approach for all affected communities.253 At a minimum, state legislatures must
undertake five essential steps to change laws governing victim impact statements:

246. Id. at 463.
247. Id. at 459.
248. MARKUS DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS
338 (2006).
249. See Bruce A. Green & Lara Bazelon, Restorative Justice From Prosecutors’ Perspective, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2299–300 (2020).
250. See id. at 2300 (“One of the principal advantages of restorative justice is that, when
victims voluntarily choose it, it better serves victims’ interests by respecting their agency.”).
251. Lau, supra note 195.
252. Mills, supra note 243, at 463.
253. See Carol A. Brook, Telling Their Stories: Whose Lives Would Restorative Justice Restore?,
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN PRACTICE, supra note 57, at 103, 115 (calling for a “dramatic
change of course” from mass incarceration policies towards community-based
interventions like restorative justice, which give offenders and victims the opportunity
to speak honestly to each other and to be heard).
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Employ independent victim advocates through the court system, not
the prosecutor’s office.

The fundamental objectives of prosecutors with respect to punishment,
under our current system, are diametric to the goals of victim-offender
reconciliation. 254 This is “particularly true in cases of violent crime, which has
traditionally called for a carceral response.” 255 Thus, it stands to reason that
channeling victims through prosecutors’ offices is a fool’s errand for
restorative justice purposes. Probation and pretrial services officers, the ones
who collect data about individuals convicted of crimes, are court-employed. 256
The officers prepare reports that the court relies on to make informed release
decisions and “choose fair sentences.” 257 Victim advocates should also be
employed by the courts. After all, even in the image and likeness of the 1982
Task Force, victim impact statements are intended to achieve fairness. 258
Fairness is a task for the courts, not the prosecutor’s office.
2.

Establish training programs for victim advocates in restorative
justice processes.

Training in restorative justice is paramount for victim advocates,
especially those who remain under the prosecutorial umbrella. At a baseline,
advocates must be trained in essential restorative justice theory, values, and
models. 259 Also, advocates should gain an understanding of the ways in which
254. See Green & Bazelon, supra note 249, at 2299 (“Whether or not punishment involves
incarceration, it is assumed to achieve objectives that restorative justice processes are not
intended to achieve.”).
255. Id.; see also KATHERINE BECKETT & MARTINA KARTMAN, UNIV. OF WASH., VIOLENCE,
MASS INCARCERATION AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PROMISING POSSIBILITIES 1 (2016),
https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/wpcontent/uploads/sites/22/2017/02/Restorative_Justice_Report_Beckett_Kartman_2016.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W6NF-4AWW] (observing the “unfortunate” exclusion of
restorative justice interventions in most cases involving violent crime, as interventions
“can both reduce violence and facilitate victim healing from violent trauma”).
256. Probation and Pretrial Officers and Officer Assistants, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-pretrial-officers-and-officer
[https://perma.cc/769K-6TBF] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (stating that “[o]fficers
investigate defendants and offenders for the court by gathering and verifying
information about them”).
257. Id.
258. See HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 84.
259. A powerful starting point is Howard Zehr’s Little Book of Restorative Justice, in which
Zehr frames restorative justice objectives and outcomes around three fundamental
principles: “harms and needs,” “obligations (to put right),” and “engagement (of
stakeholders).” ZEHR, supra note 55, at 21–23.
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trauma informs the behaviors of offenders as well as victims. 260 Perhaps most
critically, advocates should develop appreciation of the mutual healing that
emerges through expressions of responsibility, remorse, and forgiveness. 261
Further, while most victim advocates receive training to assist victims in
navigating the criminal justice system, advocates should also be trained on the
collateral consequences of imprisonment on individuals convicted of crimes
and their families—especially any children. 262 The information serves at least
two valuable ends. First, the effects of pre- or postsentencing incarceration
on people can present unique challengers to the victim-offender
reconciliation process. 263 In addition, an understanding of families on both
sides of the crime can assist an advocate to decide whether reconciliation is a

260. See id. at 18 (“Crime represents damaged relationships: damaged relationships are both
a cause and an effect of crime.” (emphasis omitted)); see also BECKETT & KARTMAN, supra
note 255, at 1 (“[P]eople who are convicted of violent crimes have often been a victim of
violence.” (citations omitted)).
261. See ZEHR, supra note 55, at 18–19. A solemn example of this dynamic in action in a recent
sentencing involves the murder of an unarmed Black man, Botham Jean, in Dallas by a
police officer who entered the wrong apartment. See David K. Li, Botham Jean’s Brother
Honored for Embrace of Dallas Officer Convicted in the Killing, NBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/botham-jean-s-brother-honored-embrace-dallasofficer-convicted-killing-n1094801 [https://perma.cc/ZB5C-LUH2].
262. The federal government’s own studies document that the impact of a parent’s
incarceration on children has both short- and longterm consequences. ROSS D. PARKE
& K. ALISON CLARKE-STEWART, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EFFECTS OF
PARENTAL INCARCERATION ON YOUNG CHILDREN 4–6 (2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/
system/files/pdf/74981/parke%26stewart.pdf [https://perma.cc/U57Y-VAYP]. Before their
parent’s imprisonment, children are often anxious and fearful. Id. at 4. Parents bestowed
with the responsibility of explaining a pending imprisonment to a child also suffer from
stress that invariably affects familial relationships. Id. at 6. After a parent’s incarceration,
over 50 percent of school-age children “exhibit school-related problems and problems
with peer relationships.” Id. Problems include poor grades, instances of aggression, and
unruly classroom behavior. Id. A smaller percentage of younger school-age children
exhibit transient school phobias and are unwilling to attend school for weeks after a
parent’s incarceration. Id.
263. As one example, the Insight Prison Project, a program started at San Quentin State
Prison in 1997, which now provides services at twenty-one state prisons, offers a Victim
Offender Education Group (VOEG), an intensive year-long program for incarcerated
people designed to understand and take responsibility for the impact of the crime(s) they
have committed. The class culminates with incarcerated people meeting with victims
“for a healing dialogue.” For an in-depth look at the VOEG, see Victim Offender Education
Group (VOEG), INSIGHT PRISON PROJECT, http://www.insightprisonproject.org/victimoffender-education-group-voeg.html [https://perma.cc/XK93-A75B] (last visited Aug.
27, 2020).
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viable strategy and, if so, how best to work with stakeholders to maximize its
chance for success. 264
Finally, advocates must be trained in crosscultural competency as a tool
to challenge false assumptions about offenders and victims that “grow out of
[their] own cultural blinders.” 265 Naturally, a victim-centered approach to
advocacy limits the ability of advocates to explore the background or basis for
the offender’s actions. 266 Rather than falling back on stereotypes, cultural
competency exalts “the importance of searching for alternative explanations”
for an individual’s actions. 267 Along similar lines, victim advocates must have
an understanding of structural, institutional, and individual racism that
pervades the criminal justice system.268 A restorative justice approach that ignores
the race-based biases that have contributed to mass incarceration is untenable.
3.

Enlist a panel of trained and neutral mediators to facilitate victimoffender reconciliation.

Most every jurisdiction maintains a list of criminal defense lawyers who
are appointed to represent indigent defendants when the public defender is
unable or unavailable to do so. 269 A similar panel should exist for mediators.
Mediators may include social workers, counselors, or volunteers who have an
established track record of community investment. Through a process led by
court-employed victim advocates, prospective mediators must be screened for
traits essential to productive victim-offender dialogue, including honesty,
empathy, openness, accountability, integrity, and conversance in restorative
justice principles. 270 Further, each jurisdiction should have a certification

264. See ZEHR, supra note 55, at 22–23 (noting that restorative justice promotes participation
of family members and “[t]hese ‘stakeholders’ need to be given information about each
other and to be involved in deciding what justice in [the] case requires”).
265. Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLIN.
L. REV. 33, 88 (2001). Although Susan Bryant’s guidance is directed at lawyers, the same
principles hold true for victim advocates. See id.
266. See id. (listing questions that should be asked, such as, “Why I am judging this [person]
negatively? Is it because we have different values, experiences or opportunities?”).
267. Id. at 93.
268. INSIGHT PRISON PROJECT, http://www.insightprisonproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/Y2BAMVHS] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (noting that the victim-offender reconciliation
process must recognize “the enormous impact of race and class in the justice system”).
269. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QGL7-Q73J].
270. See ZEHR, supra note 55, at 52 (facilitator traits include those “that emphasize respect, the
value of each participant, integrity, [and] the importance of speaking ‘from the heart’”).
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process for mediators that encompasses both an initial training and
continuing education requirements. 271 Training may be specialized for
certain crimes, such as those involving domestic offenses and sexual assault. 272
Finally, especially in the introductory phases, courts should empanel advisory
committees to gather data about the use and effectiveness of—and obstacles
to—victim-offender reconciliation.
4.

Impose prohibitions on victim sentencing recommendations.

While victims may have useful information about a defendant’s history
or culpability, proportionality demands prohibitions on victim sentencing
recommendations. 273 The danger of recommendations is threefold. First, a
victim’s belief that an offender should be punished to the fullest extent of the
law is often “untethered” from the foundational purposes of sentencing and
rooted only in the victim’s personal preference. 274 As the Model Penal Code
revisions state plainly, raw punitiveness disguised as victim empowerment
makes for a “lawless and ungovernable” sentencing structure. 275 Further, in
most cases, victims often do not have useful information with respect to an
offender’s rehabilitation. 276 Finally, the highly emotional nature of victim
impact statements risks that undue weight will be afforded a victim’s
sentencing request at the expense of other relevant sentencing considerations.
Mark Gibbs’s case is telling. There, the court was obligated to resentence
Mark to life imprisonment only upon concluding that Mark was incapable of
rehabilitation. 277 Still, much of the court’s presentence factual findings were
rooted in the retributive victim impact statements by Richie Gibbs’s family,
none of which referenced Mark’s post-offense rehabilitation. 278 In turn, the
court put little, if any, stock into the appropriate sentencing framework under
271. See MPC: SENT’G, Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, § 6.14 reporter’s note
(emphasizing “the importance of using well-trained facilitators . . . who will assist court
in their gatekeeping function to ensure that only appropriate cases are referred for
victim-offender conferencing and that such conferences are carried out in a manner that
safeguards the interests of all involved”).
272. See id. (noting that legislatures have discretion “to develop local training standards for
those wishing to facilitate victim-offender conferences”).
273. Id. app. B, Reporter’s Memorandum.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012).
278. Gibbs Sentencing Transcript Two, supra note 19, at 109 (commenting that, based on the
victim impact statements given by Richie Gibbs’s family, “it sounds as though at one time
there was, what I would refer to as, just a great big, wonderful country family”).
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Miller. 279 Prior to resentencing Mark to life in prison, the court summarily
concluded that Mark’s childhood crimes demonstrated “irretrievable
depravity, whatever that definition is.” 280
5.

Amend statutory language about a victim’s right to provide
a statement in mitigation, including a definition of restorative
justice and an explanation of the value of reconciliation-oriented
statements to the goals of punishment.

As a final—and, perhaps, self-evident—point, state statutory language
must be amended to place opportunities for victim-offender reconciliation on
equal footing with retributive processes. As a representative example, the
Illinois Victims’ Rights Act highlights the right of crime victims to be treated
with “fairness and respect for their dignity” before immediately enumerating
the rights “to communicate with the prosecution,” “to be reasonably protected
from the accused,” and the “right to [victim] safety” when determining
conditions of post-arrest release. 281 In effect, the statutory language functions
as a kind of retribution-directed roadmap for victims. Instead, if victims’
rights laws truly prize “dignity,” a statement of restorative alternatives must
comprise more than a mere statutory afterthought—to the extent that a law
accommodates it at all. Again, Mark Gibbs’s case offers insight. Far from
dignified, Betty Gibbs’s family members were debased in their victimhood.
Express statutory language elevating the right to, and value of, restorative
justice processes will reduce the chance that future victims in Illinois and
elsewhere are treated similarly.
CONCLUSION
Since the 1982 Presidential Task Force Report on Victims of Crime, the
U.S. has spent $260 billion per year on criminal justice, with negligible
returns. 282 Fruitless dollars aside, the toll extracted by the era of mass
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282.
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incarceration is incalculable.283 Punitive crime control and mass incarceration has
fractured families, disenfranchised millions of individuals convicted of crimes,
and entrenched social inequality. 284 As sentencing laws have played a central
role in escalating prison populations, criminal justice reform hinges on
changing outdated sentencing policies and practices. Overhauling victims’
rights laws to include meaningful opportunities for victim-offender
reconciliation is a critical component of the course correction. While the
Model Penal Code’s recommendations for victim-offender conferencing offer
a promising starting point, its legislative guidance stops short of
implementing lasting change. Rather, a radical rethinking of victims’ rights
laws is due. The changes I propose are integral to a decarceration movement
emerging “not solely from the wreckage of past policies but also from new
attitudes” about just and equitable crime control. 285 Criminal justice trends
aside, legislating real opportunities for victim-offender reconciliation will
honor all crime victims, especially those who resist exploitation by the
prosecutor in pursuit of hard-won mercy for the condemned.
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